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Abstract: Public and private organizations are investing increasing amounts into the development of 
healthcare information technology.  These applications are perceived to offer numerous benefits.  
Software systems can improve the exchange of information between healthcare facilities.  They 
support standardised procedures that can help to increase consistency between different service 
providers.  Electronic patient records ensure minimum standards across the trajectory of care when 
patients move between different specializations.  Healthcare information systems also offer economic 
benefits through efficiency savings; for example by providing the data that helps to identify potential 
bottlenecks in the provision and administration of care.   However, a number of high-profile failures 
reveal the problems that arise when staff must cope with the loss of these applications.  In particular, 
teams have to retrieve paper based records that often lack the detail on electronic systems.   
Individuals who have only used electronic information systems face particular problems in learning 
how to apply paper-based fallbacks.   The following pages compare two different failures of 
Healthcare Information Systems in the UK and North America.   The intention is to ensure that future 
initiatives to extend the integration of electronic patient records will build on the ‘lessons learned’ 
from previous systems. 
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1. Introduction 
There has been considerable political support for electronic patient record systems and related 
information applications (Hoffman & Podgurski, 2008).  For instance, healthcare informatics was a 
key element in the campaigns of both Senators McCain and Obama.  These commitments have been 
carried into office with the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 
otherwise known as the ‘Stimulus Bill’.  This provides for an investment of some $148 billion in 
healthcare of which $19 billion is specifically ear-marked for healthcare information technology.   
Part of this investment is intended to support the development of a US national system for the 
electronic storage and exchange of patient records.   There is an expectation that all clinicians will 
become ‘meaningful users’ of this infrastructure if they work within Federal healthcare programmes.  
The Stimulus Bill also established the post of National Coordinator for Health Information 
Technology.  They will be responsible for defining and managing the standards that govern the 
operation of electronic health records.  This post is also intended to help improve the security of the 
healthcare information infrastructures by creating common standards that avoid ad hoc local solutions 
for privacy and encryption.   
 
The Stimulus Bill created a Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research.  
This body will ensure that any future software innovations yield tangible benefits in terms of patient 
outcomes and service delivery.  The creation of the council is significant because political support is, 
in part, based on the assumption that any investments will increase the efficiency of long term 
healthcare provision.  For instance, the development of e-prescribing should ensure the use of generic 
substitutes wherever possible.  It should also help to minimise the waste that can occur through over-
prescribing or through the continued use of drugs whose efficacy has been questioned.  The delivery 
of electronic healthcare information systems should also drive improvements in accounting.  The 
proponents of these initiatives argue that the Stimulus Bill will reduce iatrogenic errors by ensuring 
that clinical decision making is informed by the contents of patients’ electronic records (Johnson, 
2009). 
 At the same time, the U.K. National Health Service’s Connecting for Health Directive has been 
working to implement the National Programme for IT (NPfIT).  This initiative has already delivered a 
‘secure’ email system to support the exchange of electronic healthcare information between some 
170,000 registered users.  It has also installed more than 15,000 connections across the NHS New 
National Network (N3); each of which conforms to a range of security and access control 
requirements.  Further progress has been made in the procurement of Electronic Prescribing Services 
as well as a diagnostic imaging system capable of storing and exchanging high-quality X-ray images.   
Other projects within the UK NPfIT have focused on the use of software to support the scheduling 
and booking of consultations and of clinical procedures.  As in the United States, these initiatives 
have carried a considerable price tag.  The most recent estimates suggest that the programme will cost 
£12.4 billion, not allowing for inflation over the ten year life of the main contracts up to 2014.  The 
central storage for the image system, known as PACS, has cost some £245 million.   However, the 
collective bargaining power derived from centralised procurement through Connecting for Health has 
derived significant savings that are presently estimated at more than £860 million. 
 
It is hard to underestimate the importance of healthcare information technologies once they become 
embedded within the everyday working practices of clinical staff.   White (2008) summarises what he 
calls a paradigm shift; “the current paradigm of medical care depends heavily on the autonomous and 
highly trained doctor to collect and process information necessary to care for each patient. This 
paradigm is challenged by the increasing requirements for knowledge by both patients and doctors; by 
the need to evaluate populations of patients inside and outside one’s practice; by consistently unmet 
quality of care expectations; by the costliness of redundant, fragmented, and suboptimal care; and by a 
seemingly insurmountable demand for chronic disease care. Medical care refinements within the old 
paradigm may not solve these challenges, suggesting a shift to a new paradigm is needed. A new 
paradigm could be considerably more reliant on health information technology because that offers the 
best option for addressing our challenges and creating a foundation for future medical progress, 
although this process will be disruptive”.   
 
Borriello, Stanford, Narayanaswami and Menning (2007) build on this vision when they describe the 
increasing deployment of healthcare information technology “By collecting patient data in settings 
more varied than doctors’ offices, healthcare providers hope to better understand the many facets of 
patients’ daily lives and then modify therapies to the individual.  Another important context is 
emergency care to accelerate access to medical records at the emergency site or to bring experts to the 
scene virtually. By giving medical professionals appropriate, complete information, we expect to 
deliver better care that’s tuned not only to the situation but also to the patient’s history. The surgical 
field also receives much attention, as surgeons and nurses must monitor and control various vital 
functions under intensely stressful conditions. Technologists are developing systems to collect and 
process an ever-increasing range of telemetry from instruments used in an operating room and to 
augment human ability to detect patterns of concern that could require immediate action”.   However, 
the increasing deployment of healthcare information technology also raises a broad set of concerns.   
This paper focuses on a paradox that lies at the heart of innovation.   The more that a team uses an 
application, the more vulnerable they become to the loss of those systems.   The following pages 
illustrate these arguments using recent failures in the software infrastructures being developed to 
support both the UK National Health Service and the US Veteran’s Affairs Administration. 
 
2. UK National Health Service Connecting for Health CSC Data Centre Incident (July 2006) 
As mentioned, the UK National Programme for IT (NPfIT) is intended to provide a ‘step change’ in 
the information infrastructure across the National Health Service (NHS) in England.  The Department 
of Health set up the programme in October 2002 under the NHS Information Authority.  A series of 
critical reports, in particular from the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, eventually led 
to the Authority being replaced by the Connecting for Health Directive on 1st April 2005.  The 
intention behind these initiatives is to improve the quality of patient care and to reduce the costs of 
providing services through the use of information technology.  National Application Service Providers 
were identified where technical and cost concerns could justify the appointment of sole providers for 
infrastructure facilities.  For these reasons, contracts were awarded to BT for the NHS Care Records 
Service.  This helps to ensure that patient records are available wherever they are required at different 
points of care.  The same company was also responsible for the implementation of a standardized 
NHS National Network (N3) using an IP-based Virtual Private Network infrastructure. N3 is intended 
to provide resilient communications links, including voice over the Internet Protocol (IP), to acute 
hospitals and General Practitioners (GP) surgeries in England.  Another company, Atos Origin, was 
awarded the contract to implement a ‘Choose and Book’ system. The main aim of this application was 
to enable patient choice.  After being referred by their physician, the patient should be able to choose 
the hospital, date and time for an outpatient appointment.   A third company, EDS, was awarded a 
contract to develop internal communications through the delivery of an NHSMail application.   In 
2004, this was terminated and Cable and Wireless assumed responsibility for these requirements. 
 
Introduction to the UK NHS National Programme for IT: There was a concern to avoid single 
suppliers for services that did not automatically need to be provided by a natural monopoly.   
Wherever possible, healthcare infrastructures should be resilient to the failure of any single supplier. 
The NHS, therefore, also created five ‘clusters’ of Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs): Southern; 
London; East & East Midlands; North West & West Midlands; and North East. It was intended that 
each cluster would be serviced by a different Local Service Provider (LSP).   These were to introduce 
an element of competition between the LSPs.  BT Health London acted as LSP for the London area.  
Accenture was responsible for the North East and for the East & East Midlands cluster while the 
Fujitsu Alliance looked after the Southern LSP responsibilities.  The Computer Sciences Corporation 
(CSC) held responsibility for the North West and West Midlands cluster through an alliance of 
companies.    
The costs of the support can be illustrated by the contract with the CSC Alliance worth approximately 
£973 million over ten years.  This consortium brought together a number of organisations, such as 
Hedra; the public sector change management specialist.   The CSC Alliance also included iSOFT.   
Their software formed the core of the Lorenzo system that was chosen by the NHS to provide an 
integrated patient management and clinical record system (iSOFT, 2009).  The scale of the Lorenzo 
Patient Administration System (PAS) can be illustrated by statistics for a single trust that consists of 
three hospitals.   This organisation serves more than 1,000 square miles. The Lorenzo implementation 
now encapsulates data for more than 500,000 patients within this individual trust.    
The CSC Alliance also included SCC, who provided infrastructure and desktop management services.   
These relationships were strained by both the complexity of the engineering challenges created by the 
CfH programme and also by the costs of meeting the NHS requirements.  iSoft’s debts grew to more 
than £93 million during 2006 and there was considerable doubt over the company’s future as CSC and 
the Australian company IBA Health competed to acquire a stake in the software developer (Bolger 
and Costello, 2007).  As the main user of iSoft code, CSC had the right to object to changes in 
management and was considering a cash offer for iSoft equity when IBA was first associated with the 
acquisition.  By late June 2007, CSC removed their objections. However, this incident illustrates the 
organizational complexity that exists even within the successful consortia of CfH.  The consequent 
uncertainty for the software supplier exacerbated communications problems with NHS procurement 
staff.  IBA completed their acquisition of iSoft in August 2007 and subsequently changed their name 
to the iSOFT group. 
This uncertainty also affected the development of regional Healthcare Information Systems within the 
CfH programme. Initial sector allocations were complicated by internal disruptions within the LSPs.    
In 2006, ComMedica's contract for supply of Picture Archiving and Communication System in the 
North-West/West-Midlands cluster was terminated, and they were replaced by GE Healthcare.  The 
IDX Systems Corporation was replaced by the Cerner Corporation in the Fujitsu Alliance following 
contractual disputes during August 2005.   The Alliance’s contract for the Southern sector was later 
terminated in May 2008. Accenture handed over most of their work to CSC in January 2007, leaving 
BT Health as the only other remaining LSP.  This has resulted in a situation where sectors can be 
broadly divided into those that are associated with the Millennium system from Cerner/BT, and those 
that are engaged to the Lorenzo product from CSC and IBA Health.  Every time that a sector contract 
was renegotiated, healthcare organizations not only faced changes in suppliers but also in the software 
components being offered by those contracting organizations.  These amalgamations have also 
undermined the diversity and competition that were intended to lend resilience to the NHS healthcare 
information infrastructures. 
Even though the initial contracts were based around Local Service Providers, they were deliberately 
drafted to ensure a unified approach across the NHS. This created considerable tensions when many 
decisions had to be taken at a local level within the constraints created by the need for national 
consistency.   For instance, BT had been awarded a £1 billion contract to link up and standardize 
NpfIT systems across the London sector.  However, the initial planning for this project did not reveal 
the rich and diverse requirements across many local healthcare providers.   This created a series of 
demands for changes to support NHS functionality during relatively late stages of the project.  BT felt 
obliged to meet these requests and consequent losses began to grow with some estimates identifying 
contingency provision of more than £1 billion to tailor the systems to these local demands.  The 
tensions between national provision and local needs shaped the decision to remove the clusters in 
favour of the National Programme, Local Ownership programme (NLOP).  Responsibility for the 
delivery of key elements in the NpfIT was devolved to ten English Strategic Health Authorities 
(SHAs).  Under this reorganization, staff who had worked for the Connecting for Health programme 
in the local clusters was transferred to the SHAs.  The CfH programme retained responsibility for 
managing the remaining contracts with the LSPs and with them the interactions with the SHAs. 
Background to the Lorenzo Application: It is against this background that the NHS Connecting for 
Health programme suffered one of its most serious system failures around 10am on Sunday 30th July 
2006 (NHS Connecting for Health, 2007).  This resulted in a serious interruption to the computational 
infrastructure provided by CSC.  The failure occurred in the organisation’s Maidstone data centre and 
was compounded by problems with their recovery data centre in Royal Tunbridge Wells.  Knock-on 
effects extended to information services in the North and West Midlands.  The outage affected 80 
trusts that were moving to CSC’s implementation of iSoft’s Lorenzo application.     
As mentioned above, Lorenzo provides an integrated patient management system.  It supports ‘an at-
a-glance view of a patient, their history and other critical medical information’ (iSOFT, 2009).  The 
present implementation collates information from more than a dozen other systems.   GPs and 
community care workers can use these tools to access information throughout a trust.  The aim is also 
to improve information exchange across the patient’s trajectory of care.  In particular, the Lorenzo 
tools can improve the accuracy and timeliness of patient data across a region when previously data 
was often isolated within individual healthcare institutions or departments.   Lorenzo was developed 
to use workflow models and time management software as well as clinical data to meet the combined 
aims of improved information access and productivity.   
Many trusts decided to support a gradual introduction of Lorenzo; this was intended to reduce the 
risks created by teething problems and by the need to tailor system support to local requirements.  The 
aim was to gradually encourage the integration of healthcare information systems with existing 
processes and to maximise the reuse of applications which already supported local staff.  For instance, 
several trusts chose to first focus on the introduction of the Lorenzo Patient Admission System.  They 
then expanded the initial trials to include the use of the healthcare information system as a means of 
supporting the Trusts’ administrative functions and correspondence systems.  Further integration was 
required to implement Lorenzo’s support for clinical resource scheduling, for networked pharmacy 
services and also for the support of particular Departments’ records management functions, such as 
those within Accident and Emergency and maternity care.    
Lorenzo can provide staff with real-time access to electronic patient records; ‘in some specialties, as 
much as 95% of the results, notes, and correspondence can be called up from the EPR on-screen, so 
some consultations are entirely paper free’(iSOFT, 2009).  Additional support was provided for the 
generation of discharge summaries and the integration of prescriptions for drugs that patients would 
require after leaving the care of individual hospitals.   GP’s and community care staff could access 
this information to support patients once they returned to their homes.  An NHS Consultant Physician 
and Medical Director for Clinical Effectiveness recently enthused about the benefits provided by 
Lorenzo; “(Staff) response has been amazing. Most now say that there’s no way they could go back to 
working without this information” (iSOFT, 2009).  As we shall see, these remarks turned out to be 
remarkably prescient. 
Overview of the Incident: The immediate effects of the first failure in this paper focussed on part of 
the Lorenzo Storage Area Network (SAN) equipment based at the CSC Maidstone Data Centre in 
Kent.  The SAN architecture is used to attach remote computer storage devices, including disk arrays 
and optical jukeboxes, in such a way that they appear to be locally attached to an operating system.   
In the NHS, this has significant benefits over Network Attached Storage (NAS) architectures where 
support staff are constantly aware of the remote location of these shared devices.  There are further 
benefits of the SAN architecture in terms of resilience because a failed server can be replaced by 
another machine that itself boots from the shared file store of its predecessor.  In the immediate 
aftermath of the failure, Connecting for Health described how "the affected trusts - all those which 
have had new administrative computer systems installed by CSC - are continuing to provide normal 
service by operating manual contingency systems. Some 80 trusts (72 primary care and 8 acute trusts) 
are affected.  NHS CFH and CSC regret the inconvenience this incident is causing and are committed 
to resolving the issues as soon as possible" (NHS Connecting for Health, 2006).  These end users 
suffered particular problems with the Lorenzo patient administration application, described in 
previous sections.  However, one trust IT manager described how: “The data centre in Kent had major 
problems at the weekend. Every application provided is off at every hospital and Primary Care Trust. 
This will really hit places like the University of Birmingham, as Monday morning is always the 
busiest time” (eHealthMedia, 2006). 
The CfH announcement went on to provide a high-level description of the causes behind the failure.  
These included ‘technical issues’ following a power system interruption that prevented local 
healthcare providers from accessing SAN data accessed via the servers (NHS Connecting for Health, 
2006, 2007).  CSC was also responsible for developing back-up systems, however, these coul not be 
brought on line immediately.  CfH developed a schedule for recovery.  Contingency plans had been 
developed for the loss of a data centre.  Service level agreements specified the restoration of access 
within two hours for strategic services, including the provision of patient care records to acute 
hospitals.   Most of the remaining data services should be restored within 12 hours of a failure 
involving a major data centre.   Less critical services could then be restored over a 72 hour period.  
However, in this incident it was not possible to provide individual healthcare organizations with a 
precise estimate of the delay before services could be resumed.  Many of these service level 
agreements had to be revised following the loss of service to the North and West Midlands.  CfH 
contracts, typically, specified that a range of reliability engineering techniques should be used to 
protect critical applications: 
1. System components should be subject to reliability assessments that identify mean time 
between failure and identify appropriate maintenance intervals; 
2. System components should be replicated within a data centre to ensure that service provision 
can continue following any individual failure; 
3. The data centre should be replicated in a different location so that services can be transferred 
following the loss of a primary facility. 
The NHS investigation stressed that a pathological combination of events had overcome the defences 
that were designed into the infrastructure of the SAN and associated applications (NHS Connecting 
for Health, 2006).   They traced the ‘root cause’ back to the failure of an Uninterruptible Power 
Supply (UPS).  This was triggered by a high temperature alarm, in the CSC Maidstone Data Centre.   
 It is ironic that the UPS is, itself, one of the secondary protection mechanisms  intended to increase 
resilience by providing an emergency supply during power failures.  However, these units have 
triggered many similar failures in other industries (Johnson, Amar, Licu and Lawrence, 2008).  The 
UPS manufacturer had conducted a number of diagnostic and other maintenance activities at the 
centre between the 22nd July and the failure on the 30th.  The UPS was off-line while engineering 
teams worked on the systems.   The maintenance activities were interrupted by fluctuating power 
supplies with a spike that led the circuit breakers to trip open.  This caused a short circuit that 
interrupted the power supply to half of the data centre for three quarters of an hour.  The SAN was 
shut down as a preventative measure. This failure affected both the primary supply and also the UPS 
that was being worked upon.  It removed both the first and second levels of protection identified in the 
previous enumeration.   The power interruption affected all clients, including the CfH sectors, which 
relied upon CSC data services from the Maidstone Data Centre.    
Once power was restored, auxiliary services quickly came back on-line including the air conditioning 
systems.  All of the SAN devices were restored. The only exceptions were two HDS 9980 data storage 
arrays that failed to boot.  An HDS technician was on site and immediately began to diagnose the 
problem (NHS Connecting for Health, 2007).  However, these two devices provided CfH services to 
the North and West Midlands sectors.   The subsequent inquiry argued that the loss of both SAN disks 
was a failure of ‘level two’ resilience.  Both devices failed at the same time rather than providing 
mutual support in the case of any single failure.   
The two SAN devices could not be immediately restored because the disks were running different 
versions of the microcode.   These differences had been introduced after an earlier software upgrade.  
Following this change, the power on the SAN devices should have been cycled.  This would have 
triggered checks to ensure that their microcode was compatible.  However, these tests had not been 
performed.  The loss of power in this incident itself triggered the compatibility tests.  These 
microcode checks failed because of the mutual incompatibility mentioned above and the servers 
could, therefore, not be brought back on-line.  
The difficult in diagnosing and correcting the SAN microcode failure mode was exacerbated because 
the manufacturer had never seen a similar problem in the past.  ‘It is understood that around 350 such 
systems are installed globally and, until this incident, no systems had ever been unavailable for more 
than four hours’ (NHS Connecting for Health, 2006).  The supplier’s staff  and CSC technicians tried 
to conduct a ‘force load’ of the microcode on the two 9980 data storage arrays during the night and 
early hours between the 30th and 31st June.  The incompatibility could not be resolved until some 72 
hours after the failure began.   "HDS immediately responded with technical engineers from the UK, 
Europe, Middle East & Africa and the Hitachi factory. The systems have now been restored to the 
users. No patient data was lost. However, during the period of time when the systems were affected, 
users had to use a manual backup system... We would like to stress the situation at CSC is highly 
unusual. Our storage systems are designed to protect critical customer data in the event of any planned 
or unplanned downtime and the Hitachi storage systems at CSC were restored with all data intact. ... 
The exact cause of the storage devices becoming temporarily unavailable is part of an in-depth 
investigation" (Mellor, 2006). 
The Restoration of Services at Fall-back Sites: The third level of resilience within the CfH model 
calls for contracting organisations to provide fallback support at a second site.   However, a common 
observation in previous incidents involving healthcare failures is that many organisations are very 
reluctant to use this alternative option to resume service provision (Johnson, 2009).   For example, 
there are often concerns about transferring operations to a fallback resource before there is any clear 
diagnosis for the primary failure.  There is a fear that any fault in the primary system will also be 
propagated into the back-up secondary system as well.  In this incident, CSC staff, therefore, worked 
with CfH teams to assess the risks associated with migrating data resources to additional sites.   
However, the decision to move support from the primary facility in Maidstone to the fallback centre 
in Tunbridge Wells was complicated by the different levels of criticality associated with the systems 
that were affected.  The decision was also complicated by the different service level agreements that 
governed the restoration of primary systems at the back-up site.  The subsequent Parliamentary brief 
describes how the decision to fall back to the Tonbridge Wells facility was delayed by over optimistic 
advice from HDS engineers (NHS Connecting for Health, 2007).    CSC told the inquiry that HDS 
continually told them that they were close to fixing the problem.     CSC, therefore, provided CfH 
with ‘strong reassurance’ that the problem would be fixed soon and that there was no need to incur the 
risks associated with falling back to the secondary system.   By 15:00 on day of the failure, it was 
argued that the engineers should have recognised the problems in bringing the SAN devices on-line.  
Most programmers will be familiar at some point in their career with the predicament faced by the 
HDS engineers.    In such circumstances, it can be hard for the teams most closely involved in 
debugging to provide realistic estimates of the time taken to resolve complex failures.  The optimism 
of the HDS engineers is also understandable given the pressure to restore services to the trusts as soon 
as possible in order to meet service level agreements for contingency provision.  Strategic applications 
were to be restored within two hours while emergency bundles were to be implemented within 72 
hours.   Any decision to fallback to Tunbridge Wells on the Sunday night would have met the 
strategic requirements, covered in the contingency plans, but would have done little to meet the 
tactical and emergency commitments that formed the bulk of the systems affected by this incident.  It 
was, therefore, decided to focus on restoring the original SAN devices during the 30th July and to 
inform the North West and West Midlands of the on-going problems.  However, further delays 
occurred in the restoration of the SANs as work progressed into the morning of 31st July.  This forced 
CfH and CSC staff to launch ‘full disaster recovery procedures’ by taking the decision to move to the 
secondary site. 
This decision to use the secondary facility was taken around 11.00hrs on the 31st June.  However, the 
operations to start the transfer of control did not begin until the evening – around 36 hours after the 
failure was triggered (NHS Connecting for Health, 2007).  The rest of the time was used to establish 
that the fallback system shared the same configuration as the two primary SAN devices in the 
Maidstone data centre.  It took a further seven hours to complete the transfer process.  Although no 
data was lost as a result of the failure, it took more time than anticipated – especially to restore the 
tactical and emergency services.  This was due to the problems in configuring complex applications to 
mirror changes that had been implemented in the primary systems.  The existing recovery plans 
described individual procedures for particular application areas: Wintel, Unix, the SQL Server etc.  
However, they did not sufficiently consider the interdependencies between these applications nor did 
they consider the detailed sequence of actions necessary to transfer the systems and bring them up 
with the critical relationships preserved on the secondary server in the Tonbridge Wells centre. 
Further problems stemmed from communications issues between HDS, CSC and CfH.   Previous 
sections have described the optimism of the HDS engineers as they tried to diagnose the causes of the 
failure before the decision was taken to roll-back to the Tonbridge Wells secondary server.   The 
subsequent investigation also argued that CSC were over optimistic when they informed CfH staff 
that the situation was ‘under control’ in the immediate aftermath of the power surge; ‘they did not 
adequately invite or involve the available technical expertise from NHS Connecting for Health in 
diagnosis, problem solving and contingency planning’ (NHS Connecting for Health, 2007). 
The technical and organisational problems in diagnosing and correcting inconsistencies in the 
microcode between the two NHS SAN devices combined with a reluctance to use the fallback facility 
in Tonbridge Wells.   Other private clients who shared the Maidstone data center had their services 
restored.  However, the critical NHS applications were still not on-line for up to four days.   This 
recovery process partly stemmed from the delay in initiating the move to secondary devices.   It was 
exacerbated by the critical nature of many of the systems that were affected – the CSC Alliance 
members and contract staff had to carefully test each of the SAN drives before functionality could be 
restored.   Lorenzo and the associated applications, described in previous sections, were unavailable 
for 50 out of the 80 affected sites for two and a half day.   The remaining trusts had access restored by 
the 3rd August, four days after the initial failure.   During this time, clinical staff and hospital 
administrators had to resort to paper based systems.  In most cases, the electronic information systems 
had not been in place long enough for staff to forget how to use the manual procedures.  However, 
this incident shows that there an increasing reliance on healthcare information technology may erode 
the skills that are necessary for staff to operate these ‘ultimate fallback procedures’.  
Numerous lessons were learned from this failure.  In particular, the differences between the primary 
configuration of the Maidstone SAN devices and the fallback provision at Tunbridge Wells revealed 
the need to ensure that the secondary resources mirrored the primary system more closely.   There had 
been a test of recovery procedures during September 2005.  The subsequent Parliamentary report 
argued that this had been less than adequate.  It did not bring up the secondary site to confirm their 
‘configuration, data currency, performance, and connectivity were adequate to meet the business 
needs’ (NHS Connecting for Health, 2007).    A number of further lessons were learned from this 
incident: 
• ‘All processes have to be reviewed and revised to take account of all of the problems 
encountered during the incident; 
• In the event of an Uninterrupted Power Supply being disconnected in future, the NHS will be 
offered the option of a planned power down rather than risk running live services without a 
UPS; 
• The SAN solution has been upgraded to ensure that it is powered by both UPS’s; 
• Additional configuration management processes have been implemented to ensure solution 
compliance between production  and back-up environments; 
• Additional data centers have been built, commissioned and are operational; 
• The HDS9980s involved in the incident at Maidstone and those providing the remote copy for 
Disaster Recovery are no longer using the combination of microcode known to cause  the 
system to close down;  
• HDS has re-created the conditions in CSC’s UK laboratory and have demonstrated to CSC 
that new processes have removed the risk of future exposure. 
• CSC have confirmed that HDS and Hitachi have reviewed the microcode quality assurance 
and release procedures to remove the possibility of other microcode combinations leading to a 
similar incident; 
• Business continuity processes have been reviewed and updated and a senior and experience 
CSC Business Continuity manager has been appointed; 
• A programme was put in place to implement tools and processes to: 
o Ensure that the recovery environments remain aligned with the production 
environment and instances; 
o Software versions at each site are fully aligned. 
• Regular audits have been scheduled to verify Disaster Recovery site status; 
• Disaster Recovery tests are carried out to provide proof of the business continuity 
arrangements with witness testing involving NHS staff; 
• Compensation of £1.2 million in total was paid to the two Strategic Health Authorities 
involved to cover the NHS costs incurred as a result of the lack of systems availability whilst 
NHS business continuity processes were invoked’ (NHS Connecting for Health, 2007).     
The incident did not end with the restoration of services via the Tonbridge Wells secondary facility.  
Concerns over the original transfer justified extreme caution in the transfer back from the fallback site 
to the primary data centre in Maidstone.  A senior CSC Vice President took four weeks to coordinate 
the return to normal operations.  A walk-through exercise was conducted to validate the plan.  This 
included the development of a communication plan that identified key decision makers within the 
alliance and across the NHS.  Contingency plans were also developed in case there were problems in 
the recovery from contingency.  Partly as a result of these precautions, the eventual transfer went 
ahead as planned. 
3. The United States’ Veterans’ Affairs VistA Server Failure (August 2007) 
This paper identifies parallels between the engineering and management response to the failure of 
healthcare information technology in two very different national systems.  In particular, it is possible 
to find similarities between the CfH SAN disk failure and a series of high-profile failures involving 
the Veterans’ Affair (VA) Administration (Associated Press, 2009).  These occurred during 31st 
August 2007and involved the VA’s Sacramento facility.  This was one of four data centres that had 
been created as the result of a centralisation process that is comparable to the changes that led to the 
creation of the CfH data centre in Maidstone.    
 
Background to the VistA Failure: Prior to centralization in 2005, the VA’s 150 medical centres had 
their own IT services, budgets and staff.  After the reorganization, the VA moved local responsibility 
for IT infrastructure to four regional data processing centers, two in the east and two in the west.  This 
centralization also had an impact on development practices.  Before 2005, changes could be made to 
applications on a local or regional basis.   This included updates to the Veterans’ Health Information 
Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA) which is comparable to the NHS Lorenzo application, 
described in previous sections.   The decentralised development practices within the VA prior to 2005, 
created a situation in which there might be several parallel versions of an application running in 
different centres.   Local IT officers liaised with the centre directors in a manner that was perceived by 
many to be highly responsive to local needs and priorities.  However, it also undermined the 
standardization that is critical for closer integration.  These distributed development practices also 
created concerns over a range of non-functional requirements including security, infrastructure 
administration and disaster recovery that all have their parallels within the UK NHS IT modernisation 
programmes.   
 
The VA reorganization created reporting and control structures that fundamentally changed this 
distributed model of software development.  The original plan was that by 2008, the VA would create 
major departments in functional areas that included enterprise development, quality and performance 
as well as IT oversight and compliance.  The scope of the project included the reassignment of 6,000 
posts within a more centralized management framework.   There were also changes in the associated 
development and acquisition models with the introduction of 36 management processes in an 
Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL). A further example is provided by the coding 
compliance tool was introduced across all of the 33 medical centres within Region 1 of the four 
divisions mentioned above.   This ensured that all of the VA facilities in that area were running the 
same version of an application.  
 
The August incident was the most severe in a succession of more than fourteen failures that occurred 
since April of 2007 after the VA’s Sacramento facility started hosting the VistA/ Computerized 
Patient Record System (CPRS) suite of clinical applications.  Most incidents only lasted for a matter 
of minutes.  However, in this case it took more than nine hours to restore services to the seventeen 
centres that were directly affected.   Knock-on effects propagated to VA hospitals and clinics from 
Alaska to northern California, Los Angeles, Hawaii, Guam, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, west Texas, 
American Samoa, the Philippines and Washington State.  The VA’s Guam centre was affected 
because they drew data from the Honolulu facility that was, in turn, connected to the Sacramento 
server.  Knock-on effects extended beyond hospitals and medical centres; they also affected local 
pharmacies.  Many of these used VistA applications to automatically produce orders and labelling.  It 
is difficult to underestimate the scale of the disruption.  For example, the Northern California 
Healthcare System supports more than 370,000 veterans with 2-3,000 visits per day.  The director of 
clinical informatics for the San Francisco VA Medical Center described this incident as "the most 
significant technological threat to patient safety the VA has ever had" (Schaffhauser, 2007).   
VA Contingency Plans: Around 07.30 on the morning of the incident, the end-users of the VistA 
system found that they could not log on to access the Computerized Patient Record System (CPRS) in 
medical centres around Northern California.  This prevented access to the on-line records for the 
veterans under their care.  There were obvious concerns for patient safety in the medical facilities that 
were affected by the failure.  Staff, therefore, resorted to a three tier contingency plan, which mirrors 
many aspects of the NHS Connecting for Health defences mentioned in the previous case study.  As 
mentioned, this incident took place against the background of organizational centralization of IT 
operations from around 150 medical facilities to two regional data processing centers in the eastern 
United States and two in the west. These Western sites cover what are known as Regions 1 and 2 from 
Sacramento, California and from Denver.   The first contingency plan was for the services that were 
previously provided by Sacramento to be handled by the Denver data centre in Region 2.  The second 
level of defence used the same approach but assumed that it would not be possible for local sites to 
making any updates on the central copy of their patient data.  In other words, they were to operate a 
‘read only’ mode.  Any changes in patient care would have to be logged locally and then updated on 
the central patient records system when access was restored.  The final ‘fallback’ position was for 
healthcare facilities to use the local files that were stored on their own computers.   These only 
provided brief summaries about each patient who was either on-site or who were scheduled to have 
appointments in the next two days.   In this ultimate contingency, clinicians would not have access to 
any data for patients who appeared with conditions that required immediate, unscheduled care. 
The first level contingency plan failed; support did not seamlessly transfer for the affected sites from 
the Region 1 facilities in Sacramento to the Region 2 centre in Denver (Schaffhauser, 2007).   This is 
comparable to the problems that delayed the transfer from the UK NHS Maidstone servers to the 
backup systems in Tonbridge Wells.  In the case of the VA failure, the intention had been that the 
Sacramento and Denver centres would provide mutual support in the event of a failure.  Hence, data 
that was updated in once site was automatically mirrored by changes in the other centre.  It should, 
therefore, have been a straightforward task to transfer operations from one site to the other.  However, 
The VA Chief Information Officer (CIO) had a difficult decision to make.  They had already 
witnessed six servers crash in the Sacramento data centre.  An initial estimate judged that it would 
take up to two days to restore services from the longer term backups stored for the Region 1 facility.  
There was a concern that by running the software necessary to support the Sacramento users from the 
Denver facility that any problems with the Region 1 code would begin to affect the Region 2 
infrastructure.  Again this mirrors the complex risk assessment that had to be made by CSC and CfH 
staff following the SAN disk failure.  In this case as in the NHS example, VA IT senior management 
were unwilling to risk the 11 remaining sites serviced from Denver without clearly understanding the 
reasons why the Sacramento system had failed.  The decision was, therefore, taken not to transfer 
services from the Sacramento centre using the level 1 contingency plan. 
 
The remaining local IT teams at 16 of the 17 VA facilities affected by the loss of Region 1 services 
followed the second stage in their contingency plans when they discovered that Sacramento would not 
be transferring support to the Denver centre.   This involved configuring local applications to rely on 
‘read only’ access using available patient data.  One of the 17 facilities could not use this option.  
Earlier in the week, staff from the regional data centre had disabled the second level fallback support 
for this facility in order to create a number of new test accounts that were used to store the backup 
data.   Although this process was repeated several times a year, there had not been any attempt to 
engineer the same level of contingency provision during these operations and so local staff had to rely 
on the summary records that were cached on the local hard drives.  The limited information available 
to clinicians created significant concerns about patient safety.  Not only were these records restricted 
to a subset of the patients visiting the facilities but they were also limited in terms of the information 
available.  They provided rudimentary lab results, medication lists and known allergies as well as 
annotated problem descriptions.  However, the pharmacy information was far from complete.  
Clinical staff could not review the previous day’s results nor could they easily access longer term 
information about the patients in their care.  The problems created by these test accounts are 
comparable to the problems created by UPS maintenance during the NHS SAN disk failure.  In both 
cases, it was difficult to maintain contingency services during the routine maintenance of complex 
systems.  Even minor changes in the configuration of primary applications, undermined the fall-back 
plans that had been developed for both healthcare information infrastructures. 
The VA facility had to rely on third level of contingency plans.  Patient care records were printed out 
on local personal computers.   This created a delay during which the first round of consultations had 
to take place without access to any medical records.   Staff quickly began to rely on hand-written 
notes for prescriptions, lab orders etc.  The worst problems arose in those areas where the facility had 
made the most progress in the adoption of electronic information systems.   In several instances, the 
parallel paper based forms were no longer available.  Recent hires had little recollection of the 
procedures used before their electronic counterparts.   Outpatient surgery was delayed because 
clinicians were uncertain about whether or not to proceed without completing the appropriate 
documentation.   There was no way to order or update information on consultations. Patients 
discharged that day could not be scheduled for follow-up appointments electronically and were told 
that they would be contacted ‘at a later date’ which increased uncertainty and created the possibility 
that subsequent consultations might missed.    
Recovery Actions: The lack of integrated communications between different departments created 
delays in obtaining discharge medications.  This, in turn, meant that some patients remained on the 
wards longer than would otherwise have been required.  These delays, in turn, had consequences for 
admissions and transfers creating a host of secondary logistic problems.   Although nurses continued 
to administer medications using paper Medication Administration Records (MAR) there were further 
delays before the initial approvals or ‘medication passes’ could be printed and paper copies of the 
MAR were distributed.  Pharmacies connected to the Sacramento data center were also affected as 
labeling and automatic dispensing equipment were directly controlled by VistA applications.   The use 
of paper processes slowed the provision of healthcare services across the facilities and also created the 
potential for error as staff were forced to adopt a broad range of coping strategies – creating processes 
‘on the fly’ rather than using agreed protocols.  Particular problems arose during shift handovers 
where, for instance, nursing staff were used to the graphical overviews and detailed drill-down 
support provided by VistA applications.  These consequences from the VistA failure were 
significantly worse than those in the NHS incident precisely because healthcare information 
technology was more widely adopted within the VA facilities.  However, the problems in this facility 
provide a stark warning for all healthcare providers of the potential hazards from system failures as 
staff increasingly rely on the support provided by these innovative systems. 
It is difficult to recreate the uncertainty that both technical and clinical teams faced in the hours 
following the initial failure.  This was exacerbated by some of the consequences of centralization.  In 
the past, local staff could call their local support officers for some estimate of the likely duration of a 
disruption.  Some of this personal contact was lost when the VA increased the responsibilities of the 
regional data centres.  Support officers in the Sacramento centre were urgently required to help 
diagnose the cause of the problem and so it was often difficult for the remaining support staff in local 
facilities to gain accurate technical information that they could pass to their co-workers.  This created 
further confusion because without an accurate assessment of the duration of any disruption it became 
difficult for local management to make informed decisions about the activation and support for 
contingency operations - for instance in moving beyond the ‘read only’ access to paper-based 
processes.  Communication between the data centre and the local facilities quickly increased once 
staff believed they had identified the cause of the problem, described in the following section.  
However, in some cases this created an alternate problem when the teams in Sacramento requested 
increasingly more detailed feedback on the apparent success or failure of changes they implemented 
in the underlying configuration of their servers.  The software problems, therefore, exposed 
underlying communications weaknesses between local and centralized support teams across the VA.  
Again, there are strong parallels between both the US and the UK experience.  The failure of the 
Maidstone data centre was exacerbated by the confusion that occurred when HDS engineers and CSC 
staff initially thought that they could restore services with minimal delays.   CfH staff were told that 
the situation was ‘under control’ in the immediate aftermath of the power surge and this message was 
passed to the local trusts.  They then had to revise their contingency plans when the estimates from the 
data centre engineering teams proved to be too optimistic. 
At the time of the failure, members of the VA technical staff were working together with an external 
contractor reviewing the performance of a hardware platform running on a particular virtual memory 
configuration.  Hence there was a large number of people on-site to begin diagnosing the cause of the 
problem as they began to observe system performance degrading without any apparent cause.  
Although the availability of additional staff on-site helped to share workload in the response to the 
incident, it also increased the problems associated with maintaining shared situation awareness across 
large groups of co-workers.  Again this has parallels in some of the communications issues between 
CSC, HDS and CfH staff following the Maidstone SAN disk failure.  
After the local clinical teams had reverted to paper-based approaches or to the use of ‘read only’ 
access on the remaining servers, Region 1 support staff began to identify the cause of the technical 
failure.  This stemmed from a change on the network port configuration for the servers that provided 
access to shared resources between the VA facilities.  The executive director of VA's Office of 
Enterprise Infrastructure Engineering later reported that this led to a mismatch between the speed of 
the Region 1 servers with the speed of a telecommunications switch (Brewin, 2008). The 
configuration change had been implemented without following all of the documentation and approval 
practices that would have ensured different support teams were aware of the change.  The change 
request was not properly documented or reviewed.  Jeff Shyshka, deputy assistant secretary of 
enterprise operations and infrastructure at VA’s CIO Office has described how the revised port 
configuration was ‘rolled back’ in order to rectify the problems in the Sacramento center (Mosquera, 
2007).   He went on to draw clear links between the technical causes of the failure and the wider 
political/organizational context; “As with any collocation undertaking of this magnitude, there will 
always be the potential for human error.  Ensuring effective communications processes between the 
teams managing the collocated VistA systems and the IT staff at the local facilities is perhaps the 
greatest challenge.”   Again we can draw parallels between the root causes of these two incidents – the 
port configuration issues in VistA resemble the microcode configuration problems in the NHS SAN 
disks. 
The decision was taken to shut down the seventeen VistA systems that were hosted by the Sacramento 
center so that they could be brought back one by one.  A plan was drawn up to restore the sites in an 
order that was determined by their workload.  Those centers that were closest to the end of their peak 
working hours would be brought back first.  This was intended to minimize interference with any 
contingency or fallback plans that had been implemented in each of the local facilities.  If the attempts 
to restore normal service exposed further problems then the impact would be reduced because the 
facility was no longer working at full capacity.  Following this model, medical facilities in the Central 
time zone were brought up first, followed by the Pacific, Alaskan and Hawaiian centers.   Throughout 
this time, support staff were in almost continual contact with the healthcare centers to determine 
whether or not the recovery plan was taking effect.   Even as it became clear that the port 
reconfiguration had addressed the underlying problems, a huge effort began to restore data integrity.  
For all of the seventeen centers directly affected and the subsidiary sites caught up in the knock-on 
effects it was critical to update the electronic records with the new orders and procedures that were 
created while VistA was off-line.   It took almost a week to bring the medication administration 
records up to date once the system was restored.  It took administrative staff more than eight weeks to 
catch up with the paper backlog from consultations and tests that could not be logged directly onto 
VistA and the associated systems after the loss of the Region 1 data center.  Concerns over patient 
safety lingered well beyond this recovery period.  The Associate Chief of Staff, Clinical Informatics 
for the VA in Northern California presented written evidence to the Senate House of Representatives 
Committee on Veteran’s Affairs (2007); “However, entering checkout data on all these patients many 
days after the fact is potentially inaccurate.   Many providers have gone back into the Computerized 
Patient Record System (CPRS, within VistA) and tried to reconstruct notes that summarize the paper 
notes that they wrote in order to mitigate the risk of missing information. This work to recover the 
integrity of the medical record will continue for many months since so much information was 
recorded on paper that day. When you consider that hundreds of screening exams for PTSD, 
depression, alcohol use and smoking, and entry of educational interventions, records of outside 
results, discharge instructions and assessments are all now on paper and are not in a format that is 
easily found in the electronic record, the burden of this one failure will persist for a long time” (Conn, 
2007). 
Many commentators were quick to link the failure to the centralization of IT services (Mosquera, 
2007, 2008).    As we have seen, these arguments were partly based on technical concerns over the 
ability of remote IT departments to respond to the detailed clinical needs of diverse local facilities.  
However, they were also motivated by deep-seated political concerns within the VA.  One of the 
medical directors who lost control of their local IT resources in the centralization from 2005-2007 
argued that “Before regionalization of IT resources -- with actual systems that contained patient 
information in distributed systems -- it would have been impossible to have 17 medical centers [go] 
down… (centralization) in the name of standardization (has caused support to) wane to a lowest 
common denominator for all facilities” (Schaffhauser, 2007).   Some of the response to the failure 
also provides insights into the Republican and Democrat perspectives on healthcare reform, especially 
when it focused on the role that external contractors had played.  Before the reforms started in 2005, 
individual centers administered their IT budgets.  They owned and operated most of their information 
infrastructure.  In contrast, much of the infrastructure that supported the four regional centers was 
provided by commercial contractors.  The VA leased proprietary IT services in stark contrast to the 
open source approach behind the VistA systems (Mosquera, 2007).  The deputy CIO in VA’s Office 
of Enterprise Development described how they were “We're hiring outside contractors to stand at the 
elbows and shoulders of our IT managers through the development organization to watch what they 
do on a day-by-day basis”.  When asked if the centralization of IT had played a role in the failure, he 
argued that "Had the IT reorganization never happened, this error might have happened on Aug. 31 
anyway because somebody didn't follow a procedure" (Schaffhauser, 2007).   These concerns over 
centralisation and control in the delivery of large scale IT services have also been raised across the 
NHS.   Both incidents reveal tensions that are common when local healthcare providers must be 
integrated into national information system architectures. 
Following the VA failure, some of the plans to migrate additional medical facilities to the regional 
centres were temporarily delayed.   The Region 1 management organized an internal review that 
reported to the assistant secretary of the Office of Information and Technology.  This was extended to 
consider a number of alternate architectures to provide different levels of resilience.  One of the 
conclusions from the initial reports was that Region 1 management had been faced with a difficult 
choice – continue with inadequate levels of service across their centres or risk propagating an 
undiagnosed error to the neighbouring region. A key lesson learned from this incident and from the 
NHS SAN disk failure is that centralization does not by itself provide increased levels of resilience.  
In the immediate aftermath of the VA incident, changes were introduced into the VistA application to 
ensure that the level 2 contingency plan offering ‘read only’ access to electronic records would in the 
future be available following maintenance activities that forced one of the Region 1 centres to fall 
back on paper-based documentation. 
A further side effect of the failure was that it highlighted the issue of compliance with the revised 
procedures introduced during the reorganization from 2005.  Previous sections have described how 
several thousand staff were affected by the changes.  It also described the introduction of 36 
management processes in an Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) as well as the use 
of new systems, such as Region 1’s coding compliance tool.  As might be expected, it can be difficult 
to change the working practices of so many co-workers.  However, the potential consequences of the 
failure for patient safety provided a valuable reminder of the importance of following the revised 
protocols.  Change management procedures were more rigorously inspected and internal audit 
procedures were reviewed to ensure that modifications to the IT infrastructure could be traced back to 
appropriate levels of management.  These changes are very similar to many of the configuration 
management recommendations that were intended to ensure consistency between future microcode 
updates on the NHS Lorenzo SAN disks. 
In the aftermath of the August 2007 failure, the VA hired an external company to review their 
contingency plans.   The ‘read only access’ to VistA was reorganized to ensure that the tier two 
fallback provision would continue even in situations where there had been account maintenance.   
Further studies were conducted into the risks of migration from a failed server to the tier one back-up 
systems in neighbouring regions.  The executive director of VA's Office of Enterprise Infrastructure 
Engineering identified key lessons from the 2007 failure which included the need to tightly control 
and supervise change and configuration management as well as diversify computer resources across 
the VA.  The Region 1 data centre supported 17 hospitals and their outlying clinics.  This created 
significant knock-on effects when the servers began to fail.   The Executive Director, therefore, 
argued that future plans would be based around regional ‘server farms’ that would each support a 
smaller number of hospitals.   Within the Sacramento area this might mean two or three farms each 
supporting six hospitals and providing an increased level of local redundancy.   This approach would 
also make it easier to focus efforts on restarting services following any future failure (Brewin, 2008). 
Concerns persist over the danger of bringing down a healthy server in the process of supporting a 
failed system.  These revised contingency plans have been tested by a series of subsequent failures, 
although arguably none have had the same consequences as those described in the previous sections.  
For example, a hardware problem affected the support provided by the Region 2 centre in Denver 
during the afternoon of the 10th April 2008.  This had a direct impact on VistA services provided to 
twelve medical centres from Colorado to California.  As we have seen, however, the secondary 
impact of these interruptions propagated well beyond the primary user facilities.   Different centres 
were affected for different periods of time between five and seven hours.  In contrast to the previous 
incident, it took longer to diagnose the precise circumstances leading to the failure.   
The recovery task was further compounded by a near simultaneous failure that affected the VA’s 
commercial telecommunications carrier.  This prevented some of the connectivity checks that might 
have helped support staff in diagnosing the VA’s own hardware problems.  The VA had previous 
changed their network service supplier in 2001 to a consortium of major providers headed by a 
‘government solutions’ division of a major provider.  This coincidence illustrates one of the key 
problems in contingency planning for patient safety.  Even when ‘market leading’ solutions are 
chosen there is still the possibility that infrastructure failures will undermine service provision.  The 
April 2008 failure also shows how significant investments following a previous incident are no 
guarantee of future reliability.  In particular, the simultaneous loss of VA hardware and network 
service provision demonstrates the importance of extending the application of contingency planning 
techniques from other domains to support patient safety.   This incident provides a case of what the 
power distribution and aviation industries term an ‘n-2’ failure; it is routine practice in these areas not 
simply to focus on mitigating the consequences of a single infrastructure component but also to 
develop contingency plans that address up to two simultaneous problems (Johnson et al, 2008).  
Hence the April 2008 incident illustrates that irrespective of the reasons for the failures there remain 
significant learning opportunities for organizations such as the VA to continue strengthening their IT 
infrastructures.   Looking to the future, the executive director of the VA's Office of Enterprise 
Infrastructure Engineering said in 2008 repeated his commitment that in modernising VistA "we will 
not break it" but he was forced to recognise that some of the core databases developed in the previous 
‘open source’ era will continue to be used a decade from now (Brewin, 2008).    
3. Lessons Learned for the Development of Healthcare Information Systems 
Previous sections have identified a host of lessons that emerge from a comparison of incidents 
affecting the NHS CfH and VA’s VistA.  There are superficial similarities in the proximate causes of 
the two incidents; both stemmed from configuration management problems.  There were further 
similarities in terms of the response; in both cases the difficulty of diagnosing the causes of the failure 
prevented the organisations involved from using the secondary redundant facilities that had been 
designed to provide fallback protection.   However, these two incidents also reveal deeper causes that 
lie in the political problems that stem from the centralisation of healthcare information technology.  
The difficulties that local clinicians experienced in obtaining accurate assessments about the extent of 
the failure from centralised software and maintenance teams helped to undermine confidence in the 
system.  The two incidents in the UK and the US both exacerbated the tensions that were created as 
national initiatives sought to impose standardised processes of software procurement and development 
over infrastructures that had previously experienced considerable local autonomy.  To this extent, 
there are as many political and organisational insights from these failures as there are technical 
lessons to be learned for the future development of healthcare information systems. 
 A number of further lessons can be identified from the problems experienced during the interruption 
to service provision in the Maidstone and Sacramento data centres: 
1. No exchange of lessons learned between US and UK/Europe.  The meta-level insights 
from these two failures include the need to create a forum for the exchange of best practices 
across national healthcare information systems.  In writing this paper, the author has had 
considerable support and encouragement from individuals involved in these incidents.   Their 
willingness to discuss the causes of the problems provides a valuable foundation for future 
development both in the UK NHS and in the VA.  However, neither agency was aware that 
the other had faced almost identical problems with their information infrastructures.  There is 
no easy way for technical teams and for systems management to exchange best practices in 
the same way that, for example, the aviation industry disseminated lessons learned between 
many different ICAO nations. 
 
2. The Importance of Configuration Management.  One of the most important technical 
insights from these two incidents is the role that configuration management plays in the 
delivery of complex, healthcare infrastructures (Johnson et al, 2009).  In the VA and the NHS 
case studies, considerable skill and expertise was devoted to ensure the provision of 
redundant architectures for the provision of reliable information systems.  However, these 
architectures were undermined by subsequent changes in configuration.  In the Maidstone 
failure, staff did not recognise that one of the SAN disk arrays was configured with different 
microcode to their peer. In the Sacramento incident, the system was reconfigured to disable 
fallback provision while test accounts were created and to store backup data.   The meta-level 
lesson is that the development of centralised IT support for healthcare information technology 
increases the need to follow consistent and rigorous configuration management processes 
because the consequences of any failure can extend across regional and local boundaries. 
 
3. Failure of Redundancy in Complex National Infrastructures.  Redundancy remains one of 
the more influential techniques for increasing the resilience of safety-critical systems.  As we 
have seen, however, there is a danger that we are placing undue confidence in the use of this 
approach within complex software systems.   In particular, the difficulty of diagnosing the 
causes of particular bugs will often dissuade senior management from rolling over a failed 
system onto available secondary hardware because of the risks that this might replicate the 
initial fault.   One of the lessons from these two failures is that senior management must drill 
and rehearse the decision making processes that are required to coordinate the deployment of 
redundant architectures.  The aim of these exercises is to reduce the uncertainty and the fear 
that can arise when organisations have to respond to major system failures.  Unless 
management are prepared to make these difficult decisions then there is a risk that we are 
wasting enormous sums of money on the procurement of redundant, fallback systems that are 
then not used in the aftermath of an initial failure. 
 
4. Complexity of Maintaining Communications with Subcontractors.  In both incidents, it 
proved to be difficult to obtain accurate estimates about the extent of the problems from the 
sub-contractors who were responsible for maintaining the infrastructures that were affected by 
the failures.   In the NHS case study, CfH staff had to deal both with teams from CSC and 
from the HDS hardware supplier.  Similar communications issues affected VA staff as they 
coordinated their response with an external contractor who was simultaneously reviewing the 
performance of a hardware platform running on a particular virtual memory configuration.   
 
5. Complexity of Maintaining Communications with Local Clinicians.  The difficulty of 
obtaining accurate technical assessments of the extent and duration of these failures from their 
sub-contracting agencies had a number of knock-on effects in terms of managements’ ability 
to coordinate appropriate responses to the NHS and VA incidents.  Arguably the most 
significant problems focused on communications with local clinicians.  Senior IT 
management were seen to lack confidence in their initial predictions.  This undermined 
clinical confidence in the response to the problem which was compounded by their focus on 
the provision of healthcare rather than on understanding the organisational and technical 
problems that prevented accurate estimates of the time to recover from any failure.   
Management uncertainty and the problems in communicating with local clinicians only 
served to exacerbate existing tensions over the centralisation of IT services in both the VA 
and the NHS.  In previous years, clinicians knew who to contact to obtain accurate local 
assessments of potential failures.  Delays from centralised IT services in providing 
information about the extent of the failures placed local IT managers in a difficult position.  
They could no longer give clinical staff the detailed predictions about the extent and duration 
of the failure that they required in order to schedule healthcare provision. 
 
6. Vulnerability of Paper Processes.  Both case studies demonstrated the vulnerability of 
healthcare providers to failures in their IT infrastructures.  The impact was arguably greater in 
the case of the VistA problems because more progress had been made towards the integration 
of services through the IT architecture.  Hence, the loss of facilities and the subsequent need 
to resort to manual alternatives following the loss of the Sacramento service provides 
numerous detailed insights for the future planning of IT resilience within the NHS.  It also 
reiterates the importance of practicing the use of paper-based fallbacks as staff become more 
and more accustomed to the services provided by applications such as VistA and Lorenzo. 
 
This list provides a partial summary of lessons that can be learned across national information 
systems.   Further work remains to be done to identify further parallels between these and other 
failures that have affected UK and US healthcare architectures.   For instance, recent security 
violations in both the VA and NHS have raised similar ethical concerns.   It remains to be seen 
whether these failures share common root causes, just as the Maidstone and Sacramento failures 
stemmed from the difficulty of managing complex centralised software through a range of contracting 
organisations.  
 
4. Conclusions and Further Work 
Public and private organizations have invested increasing amounts into the development of healthcare 
information systems.  These applications are perceived to offer numerous benefits.  Standardization 
improves the exchange of information between healthcare facilities and helps to increase consistency 
between different regional service providers.  Electronic patient records ensure minimum standards 
across the trajectory of care when patients move between different specializations.  Healthcare 
information systems also offer economic benefits through efficiency savings; for example by helping 
to identify potential bottlenecks in the provision and administration of care.   However, a number of 
high-profile failures have revealed the problems that arise when staff must cope with the loss of these 
applications.  In particular, teams have to retrieve paper based records that often lack the detail they 
have become accustomed to with electronic systems.   Individuals who have only ever used electronic 
information systems face particular problems in learning how to use paper based fallbacks.  It is, 
therefore, important that we learn as much as possible from previous failures of healthcare 
information systems.  
 
This paper has identified common lessons that can be learned from two different incidents in the UK 
NHS and the US Veteran’s Affairs Administration.   The UK case study focused on the loss of the 
Lorenzo system from incompatibilities in the microcode associated with two SAN disk servers.   In 
contrast, the VA incident stemmed from a change to the network port configuration for the VistA 
servers.  In both cases, the underlying causes related to problems in the provision of centralised 
services across complex local healthcare systems.  The common features between these two incidents 
reveal an urgent need to improve the exchange of information about previous failures between Europe 
and North America.  For example, both incidents illustrate the need for strong configuration 
management processes as local adaptations and updates are introduced into centralised architectures.   
The two incidents studied in this paper also point to vulnerabilities in the use of redundancy as a 
means of increasing the resilience of national healthcare information systems.  In both cases, senior 
management were reluctant to roll-back to secondary facilities in case they replicated the problems in 
primary facilities.  Further lessons relate to the difficulty that information systems provider’s face in 
obtaining accurate information about the scope and duration of a failure from different sub-
contracting organisations.  These problems, in turn, undermine clinical confidence in IT management 
when they cannot obtain accurate information about the impact of centralised failures on the local 
provision of healthcare services.  Finally, it has been argued that the failure of the NHS and VA 
information systems reiterates the importance of training staff to use the paper fallbacks that are 
necessary when we cannot guarantee the availability of complex information systems. These 
observations reiterate the need to exchange lessons learned in previous failures across international 
borders as more and more countries extend the integration of electronic patient records into wider 
aspects of healthcare provision. 
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